捆绑调教 题目：Political Connection and Corporate Litigation: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

时间：2021年6月25日（周五）12:00– 13:00 博学925

主讲人: 田思杨 西南财经大学会计捆绑调教 助理教授

主讲人简介：

田思杨，金融学博士，毕业于伦敦城市大学卡斯商捆绑调教 ，于2019年入职西南财经大学会计捆绑调教 担任助理教授，从事公司金融研究，包括：并购、风投/私募、公司治理，信息披露等方向。曾先后赴多伦多大学Rotman管理捆绑调教 、华盛顿大学Foster商捆绑调教 、清华大学经管捆绑调教 访学。在职期间，担任公司财务理论（博士）、投资学、以及高级财务会计等课程的任课老师。

捆绑调教 内容简介：

This paper exploits China’s recent anti-corruption campaign to study the effects of political connection on corporate litigation. Specifically, by exploiting the enforcement of an important component of the campaign, the Communist Party of China’s Rule 18 which forces politically connected independent directors to resign from public firms, we investigate how acquired protection from political connection may distort corporate litigation. We show that the weakening of political connection results in higher likelihood of and larger amount involved in corporate litigation against connected firms. Such effects are more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, financially distressed firms, and firms in regions with worse legal institutions. We also find that cases with severe information asymmetry are a crucial driving force of the effects. Finally, additional tests suggest that disconnection is associated with higher win rates of plaintiffs and more negative market reactions to corporate litigation.